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ASSESSING THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF
STATE DIRECT FILE WAIVER LAWS ON
VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME:
DETERRENCE OR IRRELEVANCE?
BENJAMIN STEINER & EMILY WRIGHT*
Juvenile waiver, or transfer, laws allow certain young offenders to be
removed from juvenile courtjurisdiction andprosecuted in criminalcourt,
where the range of sanctions is presumably greater. In the past several
decades, many states have modified their existing transfer statutes in order
to streamline the waiver process and make it easier to prosecute juveniles
in criminal court. In doing so, states have excluded certain offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction or added concurrentjurisdictionprovisions to
their existing waiver statutes. Concurrent jurisdiction, or direct file,
statutes afford prosecutors the unreviewable discretion to charge certain
juveniles in either juvenile or criminal court. Although the increased
legislation has generated a considerable amount of evaluations of the
various effects of juvenile transfer laws, few studies have examined the
deterrent effects of such laws on aggregatejuvenile crime. In this study, we
assess the general deterrent effects of directfile transfer laws in fourteen
states which have such provisions. Findings reveal that direct file laws
have little effect on violentjuvenile crime.

* The data sets examined for this paper were made available by the International
Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for "Uniform Crime Reports:
Monthly Weapon Specific Crime and Arrest Time Series 1975-1993" (ICPSR 6792) were
collected by Susan Carlson. The data for the "Uniform Crime Reporting Series" (ICSPR
2004-02-24, 2000-06-21, 2001-06-29, 2002-06-27, 2003-06-05, and 2004-06-04) were
collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Neither the collectors of the original data
nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses presented here. Please address
all correspondence to Benjamin Steiner, Division of Criminal Justice, University of
Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210389, 600 Dyer Hall, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0389. Email:
Benjamin.Steiner@uc.edu.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A separate and distinct juvenile justice system was founded on the
Progressive Era belief that juvenile offenders were merely delinquent and in
need of individualized treatment wherein the ultimate goal was their
rehabilitation.1 During the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, however, the
rehabilitative ideal that had guided both the adult and juvenile justice
systems came under attack.2 Conservatives argued that rehabilitation
programs had failed and suggested that the crime rate was rising because
offenders had no reason to fear incapacitation; in short, conservatives felt
that the current system did not deter future crime. 3 Their position was not
unfounded. Juvenile violence began to rise in the 1970s and escalated
substantially in the 1980s. 4 The juvenile arrest rate for violent crime rose
62% between 1988 and 1994 and the juvenile homicide rate doubled
between 1987 and 1993. 5 At the same time conservatives were claiming the
system was soft on crime, liberals questioned the philosophy of
rehabilitation, judges' potential biases and broad discretionary powers, and

1DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 206-09 (2002); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 474-75 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, The Juvenile Court]; Barry
C. Feld, The Politics of Race and Juvenile Justice: The "Due Process Revolution" and the
Conservative Reaction, 20 JUST. Q. 765, 772 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, The Politics of Race];
Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, CriminalizingDelinquency: The Deterrent Effects of
the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 521, 522 (1988).
2 FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 14-15 (1982);
Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case
Study and Analysis of ProsecutorialWaiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281,
282-83 (1991); Donna M. Bishop, Charles E. Frazier & John C. Henretta, Prosecutorial
Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable Reform, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 179, 179 (1989); Feld,
The Politics of Race, supra note 1, at 772; Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the
Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96,
96 (1994); Singer & McDowall, supra note 1, at 522; Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik,
ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 439, 439-41 (1985).
3 CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 2, at 94-101; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 428; HENRY
RUTH & KEVIN REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSE 82 (2003);
SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
1950-1990 5 (1993); Feld, The Politics of Race, supra note 1, at 772; Jensen & Metsger,
supra note 2, at 96-97.
4 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT,
198-99 (1999); HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN,
JUVENILE ARRESTS 1996 4-5 (1997); Feld, The Politics of Race, supra note 1, at 777.
5 RUTH & REITZ, supra note 3, at 254-58; HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 120-22
(1999).
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the ability of corrections
officials to determine when an offender was truly
"rehabilitated. ' '6 In response to the pervasive discretion in both the adult
and juvenile systems, the United States Supreme Court embarked on a due
process campaign that extended to the juvenile justice system and
essentially criminalized the traditionally informal juvenile court by
affording juveniles many of the same procedural rights guaranteed adult
defendants.7
The juxtaposition of the widespread rejection of the rehabilitative
ideal, the rise in violent juvenile crime, and the due process movement in
the Supreme Court altered the juvenile justice system from an informal,
highly offender-oriented criminal justice system to a much more formal,
victim-oriented, "just deserts" style of system.8 Simply put, the focus
shifted from the offender to the offense.
In accordance with the nationwide move away from rehabilitation that
began in the late 1970s and continued through the 1990s, many states made
changes to their existing juvenile justice acts in order to "get tough" on
juvenile offenders. 9 One of the more prevalent changes was the addition or
modification of existing transfer statutes or waiver laws that allow juvenile
offenders to be transferred to adult criminal court for prosecution.10 By
1979, every state allowed some form of transfer option. I" During the 1980s
and 1990s, virtually every state modified or amended its juvenile court

6 CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 2, at 123-24; WALKER, supra note 3, at 5; Feld, The
Politics of Race, supra note 1, at 772; Thomas & Bilchik, supranote 2, at 440.
7 Feld, The Juvenile Court,supra note 1, at 478; Feld, The Politics ofRace, supra note 1,

at 772-73; Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 2, at 453-55.
8 CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 2, at 133-35; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 427-28; RUTH
& RErrz, supranote 3, at 260-61; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile (In)Justiceand the Criminal Court
Alternative, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 403, 403-04 (1993); Feld, The Politics of Race, supra note
1, at 777; Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 2, at 453-55; see Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra
note 1, at 483.
9 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 2, at 284; Barry C. Feld, Race, Youth Violence, and the
ChangingJurisprudenceof Waiver, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3, 5 (2001) [hereinafter Feld, Race,
Youth Violence]; Daniel P. Mears, A Critique of Waiver Research: Critical Next Steps in
Assessing the Impacts of Laws for TransferringJuveniles to the CriminalJustice System, 1
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 156, 157 (2003); Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 2, at 455-56;
see Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Transfer, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 599, 599 (2004)
[hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Transfer].
10 Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 488; Feld, supra note 8, at 408-09; Eric

Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-1995: A Comparison
and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46 Juv. & FAM. CT. J.17, 23 (1995); Benjamin
Steiner & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver 2003: Where Are We Now?, 54 Juv. & FAM. CT.
J. 1, 4 (2003).
11 Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 23; Steiner & Hemmens, supranote 10, at 4-5.
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jurisdiction in some fashion.12 Most states added offenses that were waivereligible and lowered the age at which a juvenile could be transferred to
criminal court. 1 3 Many states also supplemented their existing waiver laws
by adding additional procedures that removed the decision to waive from
the judiciary for certain offenses and streamlined the process by which a
juvenile could be transferred to criminal court.1 4 As a result, the number of
juveniles waived to criminal court increased considerably during this
period.1 5 In theory, transferring a juvenile offender into the criminal court
accomplishes two goals: (1) transfer places juveniles who are beyond the
reach of the rehabilitative services offered by the juvenile justice system
into the adult criminal justice system; and (2) transfer serves as a
mechanism for deterring future juvenile crime. 16 In this study, we examine
the deterrent function of juvenile waiver laws.
II.

TYPES OF WAIVER STATUTES

There are several ways in which a juvenile can be transferred to
criminal court. Judicial waiver is the process by which a juvenile judge
may, at his discretion, transfer a juvenile to criminal court. As of 2003, this
type of waiver mechanism was found in forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia. 17 Judicial waiver typically requires a transfer hearing where an
informed judicial determination is made regarding whether the juvenile
offender is beyond the reach of rehabilitative treatment offered in juvenile
court. In this way, judicial waiver provides individualized justice for the
youthful offender.1 8
Statutory exclusion, or legislative waiver, is the method by which state
legislatures have mandated the exclusion of certain offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction. As of 2003, statutory exclusion was found in thirty-one
states and the District of Columbia. 19 Direct file, or prosecutorial
discretion, authorizes prosecutors to file certain cases in either juvenile or
criminal court under a concurrent jurisdiction statute. As of 2003, direct
12 Fritsch & Hemens, supra note 10, at 23; Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 4-5.
13 Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 23; Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 4-5.
14Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 504; Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at

4-5.
15 See CHARLES M. PUZZANCHERA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DELINQUENCY
CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 1989-1998 (2001); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5,

at 170; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 23.
16 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 2, at 290-91; Bishop, Frazier & Henretta, supra note 2, at
186; Mears, supra note 9, at 160-61.
17 Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 4-5.
18 Feld, Race, Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 9.
19 Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 5.
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file statutes were found in fourteen states and the District of Columbia.2 °
An underlying assumption of both direct file and statutory exclusion laws is
that by excluding certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction and
placing them instead under criminal court jurisdiction, juveniles would be
deterred by the more severe punishment perceived to be handed out in the
adult system.21 While some argue that waiver through statutory exclusion is
another form of direct file transfer since the prosecutor ultimately decides
how a juvenile is charged, 22 it is important to distinguish these two methods
because the state legislatures do. In fact, several states, such as Vermont,
have now statutorily excluded some offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction, even though they allow prosecutors the discretion to charge
other offenses (without reducing the offense that was charged) in either
juvenile or criminal court.23 Although direct file statutes allow the
prosecutor the discretion to keep certain young offenders in juvenile court,
prosecutors have historically been inclined to exercise a "just deserts"
philosophy in the justice system.24 By acting in the interest of the state,
prosecutors are apt to prioritize the state's interests above that of the
juvenile,25 especially for more serious offenses.26 Accordingly, one goal of
a direct file. statute would be to deter future juvenile crime, whether
specifically through harsher sanctioning of the transferred juvenile or more
generally through the threat of increased punishment to other potential
youth offenders. Despite general agreement as to this goal,27 no study has
evaluated whether or not direct file statutes actually achieve a general
deterrent effect on juvenile crime.
20 Id. at 4.
21 Jensen & Metsger, supra note 2, at 97-98; Singer & McDowall, supra note 1, at 52223.

22 See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Certification to Criminal Court: The Important Policy
Questions ofHow, When, and Why, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 262, 263-64 (1994).
23 Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 4-5.
24 Bishop, Frazier & Henretta, supra note 2, at 181; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note
9, at 599; Feld, Race, Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 20; see Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Hard
Choices or Obvious Ones: Developing Policy for Excluding Youth from Juvenile Court, 1
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 198, 203 (2003).
25 Bishop, Frazier & Henretta, supra note 2, at 181; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note
9, at 600; Feld, Race, Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 19; Sanborn, Jr., supra note 24, at
203.
26 Sanjeev Sridharan, Lynette Greenfield & Baron Blakley, A Study of Prosecutorial
Certification Practice in Virginia, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 605, 609-10 (2004).
27 See Jeffrey A. Butts & Daniel P. Mears, Reviving Juvenile Justice in a Get-Tough Era,
33 YOUTH & Soc'Y 169, 177 (2001); Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 495-96; Feld,
Race, Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 12; Aaron Kupchik, Direct File of Youth to Criminal
Court: Understanding the Practical and Theoretical Implications, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 645, 646 (2004); Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 3, at 441.
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III. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE WAIVER STATUTES
There has been extensive research assessing the various effects of
juvenile waiver statutes.

Most of this research has either described what

happens to juveniles after they have been transferred to criminal court, or
tracked the differences in sentencing outcomes imposed in the juvenile
versus criminal courts, and the disparities in recidivism rates between
waived offenders and those youth retained in the juvenile justice system.
A. SENTENCING OUTCOMES OF JUVENILES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL
COURT

Studies assessing sentencing outcomes of juveniles waived to criminal
court have considered whether transferred juveniles were sentenced to
incarceration or probation, as well as how long their sentences were. With
regard to the former, findings from some studies indicate that juveniles are
more likely to receive probation sentences when transferred to criminal
court than if they had proceeded through the juvenile system.28 Other

research indicates that the sentence outcome is contingent on offense type:
non-violent offenders tend to receive more incarceration sentences in the
juvenile court,29 while violent offenders tend to receive prison sentences
30

more often in criminal court.

Bishop & Frazier, supra note 2, at 296; Bishop, Frazier & Henretta, supra note 2, at
194; M.A. Bortner, TraditionalRhetoric, OrganizationalRealities: Remand of Juveniles to
Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53, 57 (1986); Dean J. Champion, Teenage Felons and
Waiver Hearings: Some Recent Trends, 1980-1988, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 577, 582-83
(1989); Elizabeth E. Clarke, A Case for Reinventing Juvenile Transfer: The record of
transfer ofjuvenile offenders to criminal court in Cook County, Illinois, 47 Juv. & FAM. CT.
J. 3, 17 (1996); Elizabeth W. McNulty, The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult Court:
Panaceaor Problem?, 18 LAW & POL'Y 61, 65 (1996); Richard E. Redding, The Effects of
Adjudicating and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: Research and Policy Implications, 1
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 128, 132-34 (2003).
29 Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Advantage of
Juvenile Versus Crin-inal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony
Offenders, in A SOURCEBOOK: SERIOUS, VIOLENT, & CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 248
(James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995); Carole Wolff Barnes & Randal S. Franz, Questionably
Adult: Determinants and Effects of the Juvenile Waiver Decision, 6 JUST. Q. 117, 127-28
(1989); Mary J. Clement, A Five-Year Study of Juvenile Waiver and Adult Sentences:
Implicationsfor Policy, 8 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 201, 209-10 (1 997); Marcy Rasmussen
Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An EmpiricalStudy of JudicialWaiver, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449, 485-87 (1996); Redding, supra note 28, at 132-33.
30 Fagan, supra note 29, at 248; HOWARD N. SNYDER, MELISSA SICKMUND & EILEEN
POE28

YAMAGATA,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUST., JUVENILE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINAL COURT IN THE 1990'S:

16, 24 (2000); Barnes & Franz, supra note 29, at
127-28; Clement, supra note 29, at 208-10; Marilyn Houghtalin & G. Larry Mays, Criminal
Dispositionsof New Mexico Juveniles Transferredto Adult Court, 37 CRIME & DELNQ. 393,
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FOUR STUDIES
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Studies that examine sentence length or time served for waived youth
show that violent offenses earn longer sentences in criminal court than
those typically imposed in the juvenile system, while non-violent offenses
yield longer sentences in the juvenile system.3 1 In addition, Kurlychek and
Johnson found that even when all legal and many extralegal factors were
controlled for, juveniles waived to criminal court were sentenced to longer
sentences than young adults between the ages of32eighteen and twenty-four
who were sentenced over the same period of time.
On the other hand, other studies have revealed that even when criminal
courts imposed substantial sentences, parole authorities typically released
youthful offenders after serving less time than they would have served had
they remained in the juvenile system.3 3 Therefore, it remains unclear
whether waived juveniles are in fact punished more harshly when waived to
criminal court.
B. RECIDIVISM OF JUVENILES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT
In an effort to assess the specific deterrent effect of waiver laws,
scholars have also compared the difference in recidivism rates between
waived youth and similarly situated juvenile offenders. Contradicting the
expectations of deterrence advocates, recidivism rates have generally been
lower for youth retained in juvenile court when compared to those
transferred to criminal court.34 Transferred juveniles have also been found
403 (1991); Aaron Kupchik, Jeffrey Fagan & Akiva Liberman, Punishment, Proportionality,
andJurisdictionalTransfer of Adolescent Offenders: A Test of the Leniency Gap Hypothesis,
14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 57, 64-65 (2003); McNulty, supra note 28, at 66-69; David L.
Myers, Adult Crime, Adult Time: Punishing Violent Youth in the Adult Criminal Justice
System, 1 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 173, 184-85 (2003); Podkopacz & Feld, supra note
29, at 485-89; Redding, supra note 28, 132-34; Thomas & Bilchik, supranote 2, at 473-74.
31 Fagan, supra note 29, at 248-49; Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court: Does It Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 177 (1996);
Clement, supra note 29, at 209-11; Robert 0. Dawson, An Empirical Study of Kent Style
Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 975, 1032-35 (1992); Myers,
supra note 30, at 186-87; Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 29, at 486-89; Marcy Rasmussen
Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice:Persistence,Seriousness
and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. 73, 164-65 (1995).
32 Megan C. Kurlychek & Brian D. Johnson, The Juvenile Penalty: A Comparison of
Juvenile and Young Adult Sentencing Outcomes in Criminal Court, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 485,
500 (2004).
33 Bortner, supra note 28, at 57-59; Clement, supra note 29, at 213; Eric J. Fritsch, Tori
J. Caeti & Craig Hemmens, Spare the Needle but Not the Punishment: The Incarcerationof
Waived Youth in Texas Prisons, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 593, 603 (1996); Eric J. Fritsch, Craig
Hemmens & Tory J. Caeti, Violent Youth in Juvenile and Adult Court: An Assessment of
Sentencing Strategies in Texas, 18 LAW & POL'Y 115, 124-25 (1996).
34 Fagan, supra note 29, at 249-50; Bishop et al., supra note 31, at 180-83; David L.
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to re-offend sooner and more often than those youth processed in the
juvenile system. 35 The studies by Donna Bishop and her colleagues are
especially relevant to our focus. 3 6 These studies relied on data from
Florida, where the majority of cases transferred to criminal court are waived
by direct filing,37 suggesting that this type of waiver may not have a
deterrent effect on the juvenile offenders who are transferred to criminal
court.

8

On the other hand, while it is likely the state legislatures were trying to
improve the judiciary's ability to sentence serious and violent juvenile
offenders more severely by allowing for adult criminal sanctions in certain
cases, it is equally plausible that they were attempting to deter potentially
serious and violent juvenile crime in general. Determining these aggregatelevel effects, however, would not be possible from the aforementioned
individual level studies.
C. GENERAL DETERRENT EFFECTS OF WAIVER LAWS
There has been much less research conducted on the general deterrent
effect of juvenile waiver laws. Accordingly, the extant evidence regarding
their effectiveness can hardly be called conclusive. Compounding this
problem is the fact that each of the existing studies employed slightly
different methods in assessing their respective states.
Singer and McDowall assessed the general deterrent effects of the New
York Juvenile Offender Law. 39 They examined monthly juvenile arrest data
between the years 1974 and 1984 for each of the five crimes (homicide,
aggravated assault, robbery, rape, and arson) that were statutorily excluded
from juvenile court jurisdiction by the New York law. 40 Singer and
McDowall found significantly lower rates of arrest for rape and arson in
New York City after the law went into effect; however, their control series,
Philadelphia, yielded similar results for arson and significantly lower arrest
rates for homicide and aggravated assault despite not having a waiver law,

Myers, The Recidivism of Violent Youths in Juvenile and Adult Court: A Consideration of
Selection Bias, I YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 79, 90 (2003); Podkopacz & Feld, supra
note 29, at 489-91; Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 31, at 165-70.
35Fagan, supra note 29, at 249-51; Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548,
555-56 (1997).
36 See Bishop et al., supra note 31; Winner et al., supra note 35.
37 Bishop, Frazier & Henretta, supra note 2, at 183-84.
38 Butts & Mears, supra note 27, at 178-79.
39 See Singer & McDowall, supra note 1.
40 Id. at 526-27.
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suggesting a history effect. 41 The study also revealed significantly higher
arrest rates for aggravated assault and robbery in upstate New York after the
waiver law went into effect.42 As a result, Singer and McDowall concluded
that New York's version of a legislative waiver law had no appreciable
effect on deterring violent juvenile crime.4 3
Jensen and Metsger evaluated the effect of Idaho's legislative waiver
statute on violent juvenile crime.44 They observed that juvenile arrest rates
went down in nearby states during the time after the waiver law was
enacted; however, the juvenile arrest rate for violent crime actually
increased 18% in Idaho.4 5 In a subsequent regression analysis, Jensen and
Metsger confirmed the conclusion from their time series analysis: when
controlling for infant mortality, population, and agency reporting, the
legislative waiver statute was not significantly related to lower arrests for
violent juvenile crime.46
Risler, Sweatman, and Nackerud assessed the effect of Georgia's
Juvenile Justice Reform Act by comparing the mean number of juvenile
arrests for each of the violent index crimes for the two years prior to the
enactment of the legislation to the mean number ofjuvenile arrests for each
of the violent index crimes for the year the law was enacted and the
subsequent year.
No significant differences in the mean juvenile arrest
rates were revealed for any of the violent crimes in Georgia after the waiver
law was enacted.4 8
The findings from these three studies suggest that legislative waiver
statutes do not achieve a general deterrent effect. However, aside from
Singer and McDowell's study,49 the existing evidence regarding legislative
waiver laws should be interpreted cautiously because the other studies did
not use statistical techniques that would have allowed them to control for
both serial correlation and regression effects.5 °
Other aggregate-level deterrence research has revealed some evidence
that supports a general deterrent effect resulting from certain policy changes
Id. at 527, 530-31.
Id. at 530-31.
41 Id at 531.
41
42

44 See Jensen & Metsger, supra note 2.
45 Id. at 100-01.
46

Id. at 101.

47 Edwin A. Risler, Tim Sweatman

& Larry Nackerud, Evaluating the Georgia
Legislative Waiver's Effectiveness in DeterringJuvenile Crime, 8 REs. ON Soc. WORK PRAC.
657, 661-62 (1998).
41 Id. at 663.
49 Singer & McDowall, supra note 1.
50 See DAVID McDoWALL ET AL., INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 13-15 (1980).
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aimed at increasing the level of punishment. However, these effects have
been characterized as only short-term. 51 Additionally, many policy changes
have generated little or no effect,52 and there have even been some instances

of increases in crime.5 3 Taken together, these findings suggest that general
deterrence-based policies may not be effective crime reduction strategies.
This conclusion is perhaps best supported by Pratt and Cullen's findings
from their meta-analysis of the macro-level predictors of crime. Pratt and
Cullen found only one criminal justice-related predictor (incarceration
effect) to have an effect size greater than 0.30 and only one other (arrest
of criminal justice related
ratio) to be greater than 0.20. The majority
54
predictors had effects on crime under 0.10.

The addition of juvenile waiver laws has been the most prevalent "get
tough" legislation since the rise in juvenile crime, with nearly all of the
states creating or modifying existing waiver statutes since 1979.55 In spite
of the evidence against policies and laws aimed at deterring crime, such
policies and laws still pervade the criminal justice system and have filtered
down to the juvenile justice system. Research examining the general
deterrent effect of legislative waiver laws, while limited, suggests that a
deterrent effect may not be achieved by such policies. Yet, while these
evaluations of legislative waiver laws are uncommon, prior consideration of
the relative effects of direct file laws has not yet occurred. We attend to this
matter here.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this study, we examined the relative effects of the direct file waiver

laws in the fourteen states that have such laws. Given that the validity of
the assessment of each state's law was dependent on whether or not we
examined the correct time period in which the law took effect, extra

51

Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First

Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2-3 (1998).
52 Francis T. Cullen et al., Dangerous Liaison? Rational Choice Theory as the Basis for
Correctional Intervention, in

RATIONAL CHOICE AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: RECENT
RESEARCH AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 279, 282-84 (Alex R. Piquero & Stephen G. Tibbetts

eds., 2002); Nagin, supra note 51, at 33-36; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does
Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD.
173, 198 (2004).
53 Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the
CriminalSanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 453-59 (1993).
54 Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictorsand Theories
of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, in 32 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 373, 398-402

(Micheal Tonry ed., 2005).
55 Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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precautions were taken in order to ensure the dates we examined were
accurate.
First, we examined the legislative history of the statutes for each state
that has a direct file waiver provision. Second, in order to verify our
findings, we conducted an Internet survey5 6 of each state's attorney
general's office as well as each state's legislative services committee. After
receiving these responses, we compared the data from the state offices to
our initial findings and changed the effective dates of two states. With the
exception of these two states, the results from the survey either were
unusable (i.e. state officials were unsure) or confirmed our findings. The
current (as of 2004) status of the fourteen states and the effective dates of
the initial or substantive portion of the direct file waiver statutes are detailed
in Appendix 1.
In order to assess the relative effects of the direct file waiver laws, we
used a quasi-experimental multiple interrupted time series design similar to
the one used by Singer and McDowall. 7 The interrupted time series is a
strong design, and the only threat to internal validity that poses a problem is
history. 58 A history effect is operating if some other unmeasured and
uncontrolled factor prompts the observed change in the dependent series.
History threats of this nature are best resolved by introducing a control
series.5 9 Finding an appropriate control series, however, posed a problem
for a couple of reasons. First, we did not want to use states that enacted a
deterrence-based waiver provision (direct file or statutory exclusion)
during, or close to, the period we were assessing in the corresponding
intervention state. As a result, several states 60 were excluded as possible
controls. Second, we realized that two states are rarely alike, so we were
limited in our possible choices for controls. Nonetheless, we still attempted
to address this threat as adequately as possible by selecting two different
states as controls for each state in which an effect was observed. Each
control state did not have a direct file or statutory exclusion waiver
provision go into effect during, or near, the time period assessed in the
intervention state. The control states also resembled the state in which a
56 See DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD

(2d ed. 2000).
57 Singer & McDowall, supra note 1, at 526-27.
58 DONALD

T.

CAMPBELL

&

JULIAN

C.

STANLEY,

EXPERIMENTAL

AND

QUASI-

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 37-40 (1963); WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D.
COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR

GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE

179 (2002).

supra note 58, at 55-57; SHADISH,
note 58, 181-84; Singer & McDowall, supra note 1, at 527.
60 See Steiner & Hemmens, supra note 10, at 8-24.
59 CAMPBELL & STANLEY,

COOK & CAMPBELL,

supra
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significant change in the juvenile arrest rate was observed as closely as
possible in size, location, percentage of the population under eighteen, and
their juvenile arrest rate for violent crime.
A. DATA
The respective series used to assess the effects of the waiver laws
consisted of each state's monthly juvenile arrest rate (per 100,000 persons
under eighteen) for homicide/manslaughter as well as all violent index
crime (homicide/manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) for
each month during the five years prior to the effective date of the law and
for each month of the five years after the law went into effect. 61 The total
number of juvenile arrests for homicide/manslaughter and violent crimes
indeces were obtained from several data sets housed at the International
First, we used Susan
Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Carlson's monthly arrest data compiled from the Uniform Crime Reports
for the years 1975 through 1993.62 Next, we merged Dr. Carlson's data
with the monthly arrest data from the individual Uniform Crime Reports for
the years 1994 to 2002, which were also housed at the Consortium. 63 The
population estimates were obtained from United States Bureau of the
Census.
Arrest data are advantageous because they offer age-specific
information on various crimes. Additionally, when used to assess only
changes in the level of arrests, the data are not subject to the criticism that
official data under-represent delinquent activity.64 However, arrests are
imperfectly related to juvenile crime, as they are influenced by the behavior
of both the police and juveniles. Although interrupted time series designs

61California's direct file waiver law went into effect with the passage of Proposition 21
on March 28, 2000. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (2004). As a result, data were only
available through the end of 2004; slightly less than the five years after the law went into'
effect. April 1, 2000 was used as the intervention point for the California series in order to
facilitate the use of the monthly arrest data.
62We contacted Dr. Carlson to assess the validity of the state level data. Dr. Carlson
advised that univariate ARIMA predictions models were used to estimate some of the state
level data; however, Michigan was the only one of those states which was examined here,
and the missing data were not observed for our time period of interest. E-mail from Dr.
Susan Carlson, Associate Professor of Sociology, Western Michigan University, to authors
(Sept. 7-9, 2004) (on file with corresponding author).

63Data for the years 2003 and 2004 for Arizona and California were obtained from each
state's data collecting agency.
64 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 111-14.
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can tolerate some measurement bias, the data used here could be subject to
an instrumentation threat.6 5
It was reasonable to assume that an instrumentation effect could occur
if the police altered their arrest practices as a result of the respective waiver
laws going into effect. For example, police may have arrested juveniles
eligible for waiver more vigorously because they felt the juveniles would be
subject to greater sanctions and not just a "slap on the wrist." On the other
hand, police may also have arrested juveniles for less serious crimes to
protect them from being subjected to the perceived harshness of criminal
court. These possibilities were also noted by Singer and McDowall.66
However, unlike Singer and McDowall, who examined the effect of the
New York Juvenile Offender Law on juvenile arrest rates in New York
City, we assessed the effects of the direct file waiver laws on the juvenile
arrest rates for each of the respective states. For an instrumentation effect
to have occurred, multiple police agencies within the individual states
would have had to alter their arrest practice in the same direction. Although
possible, we find this extremely unlikely.
B. MODELING TECHNIQUES
After computing the monthly arrest rates, each series was analyzed
using autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) techniques.
ARIMA modeling of the data allowed us to control for any serial
dependence between the time points and estimate the differences before and
after the effective date of the respective waiver laws. We developed a
"white noise" model for each series to control for nonstationarity, serial
correlation, and seasonality, all of which are often observed with time series
data.67 Next, an intervention series (the time points after the respective
waiver laws went into effect) was added to the model to represent the
effects of the intervention. If a change was observed following the effective
date of the intervention (the waiver law), it was reflected in the intervention
model.
In order to model the intervention series, the appropriate transfer
function (zero order, first order, or pulse) was used to estimate the impact of
the intervention series on their corresponding white noise dependent series.
We relied on Singer and McDowell's prior work and hypothesized that an
65 CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note

58, at 41;

SHADISH, COOK & CAMPBELL,

supra note

58, at 179.
66 Singer & McDowall, supra note 1, at 528.
67 See John K. Cochran, Mitchell B. Chamlin & Mark Seth, Deterrenceor Brutalization?
An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107
(1994); MCDOWALL ET AL., supra note 50.
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abrupt permanent impact (zero order transfer function) would be observed
after the intervention series was added to the model.68 In the event our
hypothesis was mispecified, we also estimated the models using both the
first order and pulse function. After determining the functional form of best
fit, we subjected each final model to a number of diagnostic checks to
verify whether the final model was indeed adequate. The final models and
fit statistics for both the violent crime and homicide/manslaughter arrest
rate series can be found in Appendix 2. By estimating each of the various
transfer functions and subjecting the final models to diagnostic testing, we
were confident that we determined the most precise model. Simply put, we
felt confident in our ability to gauge the general deterrent effect of the
various direct file waiver laws.
V. FINDINGS

Table I presents summaries of the series for each state's juvenile arrest
rate for violent crime. States which were evaluated are in regular type,
while the respective control states, if an effect was observed, are in italics.
Since we found the zero order transfer function model to be the most
appropriate for the majority of the series, we reported the estimate of the
parameter (co), which represents the shift in the level of the series. In a
couple of instances, we determined a pulse function was more appropriate.
For these series we reported the parameter (co), representing the shift in the
level of the series and the parameter (5), which estimates the rate of change
for the shift in the level of the series.
As can be seen in Table 1, most of the states' violent juvenile crime
rates were not lower in the period after their direct file waiver law was
enacted. Nine states were unaffected by the law, while Arkansas and
Montana experienced an increase in arrests for violent juvenile crime after
their direct file waiver law went into effect. An increase in Colorado's
juvenile arrest rate was observed, but one of the control series, Nevada,
experienced a similar effect, suggesting a history effect. Louisiana also
experienced an increase in arrests, but the effect was short lived, as
evidenced by the fact that the pulse function was the form of best fit. The
series from Michigan did reveal evidence of a deterrent effect. Michigan
experienced a decline in the level of juvenile arrests for violent crime after
its direct file law went into effect. These effects appear to be real, as
neither of the control series, Indiana or New York, demonstrated a similar
decline.

68

Singer & McDowall, supra note 1, at 527.
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Table 1
Summary of Intervention Analyses of Violent Juvenile Crime for States with
Direct File Statutes
Series
Arizona
Arkansas
Mississippi
Missouri
California
Colorado
Utah
Nevada
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
Michigan
Indiana
New York
Montana
North Dakota
Idaho
Nebraska
Oklahoma
Vermont
Virginia
Wyoming
Control series italicized.
p < .10
p < .05

02
0.07
0.07
0.05
-0.21
0.01
0.48
0.23
0.76
-0.07
-0.01
0.38
-0.01
-0.03
-0.55
-0.02
-0.00
0.32
0.04
0.19
0.01
-0.00
-0.16
-0.02
0.16

t

-0.26
1.79*
1.09
-1.11
0.34
1.97**
1.14
3.89**
-0.32
-0.03
0.03**
-0.05
-1.87"
-3.59**
-0.61
-0.02
1.69*
0.34
1.06
0.17
-0.16
-0.91
-1.17
0.62

6

0.53

T

1.87*
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Table 2 portrays the summaries of the time series designs for the
juvenile arrest rates for homicide/manslaughter. As can be seen, no effects
were observed in thirteen of the states. Oklahoma did experience an
increase in arrests, but the pulse function was determined to be the most
appropriate model. As such, the effect observed there was immediate, but
temporary. Thus, it seems there is no evidence in support of a deterrent
effect on homicides committed by juveniles resulting from direct file
waiver laws.
Table 2
Summary of InterventionAnalyses of Juvenile Murder/Manslaughterfor
States with Direct FileStatutes
Series
0
Arizona
-0.01
Arkansas
0.10
California
0.02
Colorado
0.01
Florida
-0.01
Georgia
-0.02
Louisiana
-0.00
Michigan
-0.01
Montana
0.00
Nebraska
-0.01
Oklahoma
0.41
Mississippi
-0.09
Missouri
-0.00
Vermont
-0.12
Virginia
-0.01
Wyoming
0.03
Control series italicized.
p<. 10
p < .05

T
-0.30
1.11
0.86
0.55
-0.43
-1.18
-0.18
-1.42
0.11
-0.73
2.56**
-1.21
-0.02
-1.60
-0.74
0.70

6

-0.52

t

-2.03**
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

During the last two decades, juvenile arrests for violent crimes reached
an all-time high.69 In response, many states have amended their existing
juvenile waiver laws or added mechanisms which allow for easier removal
of certain youthful offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction. One such
addition is a direct file waiver statute, which gives prosecutors
unreviewable discretion to charge juvenile suspects in criminal court for
certain offenses. Although direct file statutes also allow the prosecutor the
discretion to keep certain young offenders in juvenile court, prosecutors are
apt to prioritize the state's interests above that of the juvenile, 70 especially
for more serious offenses 71 such as those examined in this study. The
legislature's goal in enacting a direct file statute seems to be to have an
effect on criminal behavior and criminal offending, whether through
retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence. While findings from empirical
studies have not necessarily supported the idea that waived juveniles
receive harsher sanctions or are less likely to commit crime when compared
to similarly situated juveniles, 72 these laws could have had an effect on
aggregate rates of juvenile offending. Indeed, arrest rates for violent
juvenile crime have declined nationally and, as of 2003, are near an all-time
low. 73 Thus, it is possible that would-be juvenile offenders are being
generally deterred by the threat of receiving criminal sanctions as a result of
being waived to criminal court via a direct file waiver statute.
The findings from this study do not support this conclusion. We feel
confident in inferring from our results that direct file waiver laws have had
little effect on violent juvenile crime. The analysis reported here revealed
that the direct file law had a deterrent effect in only one state (Michigan).
The other thirteen states that have direct file waiver laws have either seen
no effect or have experienced an increase in their arrest rate for violent
juvenile crime. Furthermore, no state experienced a lower juvenile
homicide/manslaughter rate after their direct file waiver law went into

69

HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, JUVENILE

ARRESTS 2003 4-5 (2005).

70 Bishop, Frazier & Henretta, supra note 2, at 181; Feld, Race, Youth Violence, supra
note 9, at 19; Feld, Juvenile Transfer,supra note 9, at 600; Sanborn, Jr., supra note 24, at
273-75.
71 Sridharan et al., supra note 26, at 618.
72 For a review, see Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult CriminalJustice
System, 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE 81 (2000), and Redding, supra note 28.
73 SNYDER, supra note 69, at 4-5.
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74
effect. As a result, any decline in juvenile arrest rates observed nationally
was likely a result of factors other than a deterrent effect ensuing from
states enacting direct file waiver laws.
On the other hand, it is also possible that those states that enacted a
direct file waiver statute already had a waiver mechanism, such as judicial
waiver or legislative waiver, in place. The enactment of this earlier
legislation could have actually caused any deterrent effect that may have
occurred on that state's violent juvenile crime rate. With respect to judicial
waiver, we find this extremely unlikely. Judicial waiver has been a part of
most states' juvenile codes for many years before the periods which were
examined in this study.75 Judicial waiver is a mechanism designed to
remove from juvenile court those juveniles who have exhausted the
resources of the juvenile system, not to deter. 76 The judicial waiver
represents the juvenile court's approach to individual sentencing; it is not
deterministic or certain.7 7 in order for juveniles to be deterred, they would
have to perceive that they would be waived for the act they may potentially
commit. However, it is unlikely that most juveniles suitable for waiver will
perceive such waiver. On the other hand, it is far more likely
that those
78
cases eligible for direct file waiver will begin in criminal court.

Legislative waiver statutes exist in thirty-one states, four of which
(Georgia, Montana, Vermont, and Virginia) were evaluated here.
Virginia's (1996) and Montana's (1987) legislative waiver statutes were
enacted well after their direct file waiver provisions went into effect. As
such, while deterrent effects may have been realized as a result of those
laws, their enactment would not have confounded the analysis for either
state evaluated here. In both Georgia and Vermont, the direct file statute
was enacted at the same time as the legislative waiver statute. While any
deterrent effects observed in this study could have also been due to those
states' legislative waiver statutes, prior deterrent effects could not.
Accordingly, the effects, or lack there of, observed here should be taken
seriously.
In speculating why deterrent effects were generally not observed, it
may be instructive to examine the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in

74 See id.
75 Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 505-07; Fritsch & Hernmens, supra note 10,

at 23.
76 Feld, Race, Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 8-9.
77 Feld, supra note 8, at 408.
78 Bishop, Frazier & Henretta, supra note 2, at 181-82; Feld, Race, Youth Violence, supra

note 9, at 19.
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Roper v. Simmons.7 9 In holding that the execution of persons who
committed homicide when under the age of eighteen violates the Eighth
Amendment, the Roper Court relied in part on social science evidence
regarding the reduced culpability of juveniles. 80 Although the Roper Court
reiterated the Supreme Court's long-standing position that the efficacy of
legal reforms is to be left to the state legislatures, it also restated the Court's
position in Thompson v. Oklahoma,8 1 that the same characteristics which
make juveniles less culpable than adults are the same characteristics that
make them less susceptible to being deterred.82 Particularly relevant are
arguments from developmental psychologists that juveniles, compared with
adults, may hold very different perceptions of risk and may be considerably
more deficient in their ability to understand, envision, or focus on the longterm consequences of their actions. 83 Specifically, juvenile decisions, as
opposed to adult decisions, are influenced more heavily by the potential
rewards of their choices rather than by the potential risks involved, as well
84
as the short-term, rather than long-term, consequences of their actions.
Thus, if juveniles are unlikely to be deterred by the potential of receiving a
death sentence when committing the most serious of illegal acts, it seems
improbable that the possibility that they could be transferred to criminal
court for committing a similar, although typically less severe, crime would
weigh heavily on their decision-making process.
Finally, it should be noted that under normal circumstances a multiple
interrupted time series, while the quasi-experimental design that is the least
susceptible to internal validity threats, is nevertheless a design that is weak
externally. 5 The reason for this external weakness is that an intervention is
typically assessed in one geographic locality during one period of time.
However, the assessment of multiple series in different locations over
different time periods, as was the case in this study, strengthens the external
validity of the findings. 86 We contend that, unlike previous general

7' 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
80 See id. at 569-70.
81 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
82 See Roper, 543 U.S at 571-72.
83 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas

Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A

Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137,
157 (1997); Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, DiminishedResponsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011-13 (2003).
84 See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 83, at 1011-13.
85 CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 58, at 40; SHADISH ET AL., supra note 58, at 181.
86 Chad S. Briggs, Jody L. Sundt & Thomas C. Castellano, The Effect of Supermaximum
Security Prisonson Aggregate Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1352
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deterrence studies, 87 the relatively consistent findings in this analysis of all
fourteen states with direct file statues can aid in determining whether direct
file waiver laws have a general deterrent effect on serious and violent
juvenile crime. From our findings, it seems there is little evidence to
presume they do.

(2003).
87 See Singer & McDowall, supra note 1.
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Appendix 1
State Direct File Waiver Statutes 2004

State &
Citation

Arizona
ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 13-501
(2004)

Arkansas
ARK. CODE

Ages
Direct File
Waiver
Law
Applies
14 and
older

14 and
older

ANN.
§ 9-27-318
(2004)

California
CAL.
WELF. &
INST. CODE

§ 707
(2004)

16 and
older
14 and
older

Crimes Eligible for Direct File
Waiver

A class 1 or 2 felony; a class 3
felony in violation of any type
of major violent or property
crime; a class 3, 4, 5, or 6
felony involving the
intentional or knowing
infliction of serious physical
injury or the discharge or use
of, or threatening exhibition
with a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument; any
felony committed by a chronic
felony offender
Capital murder in the 1st
degree; kidnapping;
aggravated robbery; rape; 1st
degree battery; terroristic act

Direct File
Waiver
Law
Effective
Date
7/1/1998

1/1/1990

Any felony
An offense punishable by
death; a felony in which the
minor used a firearm; any
offense listed below if the
minor has previously
committed such an offense, or
the offense was in association
with a gang, or motivated by
discrimination

4/1/2000
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16 and
older

Colorado
COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-

14 and
older

2-517
(2004)

Florida
FLA.STAT.

14 and
older

§ 985.227
(2004)

16 and
older

Murder; arson; robbery; rape;
forcible sexual assault; lewd
and lascivious conduct;
kidnapping; discharge of a
firearm; aggravated assault;
manufacturing a controlled
substance; cariacking;
aggravated mayhem; witness
intimidation
Class 1 or 2 felony; violent
felony; felony involving a
weapon; vehicular homicide or
assault; arson; any felony if
previously adjudicated of two
or more felonies in the past
two years
Arson; sexual battery; robbery;
kidnapping; aggravated child
abuse; aggravated assault;
aggravated stalking; murder;
manslaughter; unlawful
throwing, placing, or
discharging of a destructive
device, or bomb; armed
burglary; aggravated battery;
lewd and lascivious conduct;
felony while carrying a
firearm; grand theft; carrying a
weapon on school grounds;
home invasion robbery;
carjacking; grand theft of a
motor vehicle
Any felony or misdemeanor if
adjudicated for two previous
offenses, one of which is a
felony

[Vol. 96

1/1/1988

10/1/1979
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Georgia
GA. CODE
ANN. § 1511-28
(2004)

Any age

Louisiana
LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN.
art. 305
(2004)

15 and
older

Michigan
MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
§ 712A.2D
(2004)
Montana
MONT.
CODE ANN.
§ 41-5-205
(2004)

14 and
older

13 and
older

12 and
older

16 and
older

Any act punishable by life
imprisonment
Presumptive transfer for
murder; voluntary
manslaughter; rape;
aggravated sodomy; child
molestation; sexual battery;
armed robbery if committed
with a firearm
Murder; attempted murder;
rape; armed robbery;
kidnapping; aggravated
burglary; aggravated battery
with a firearm; a second
aggravated battery or burglary;
a second felony involving
manufacture; distribution;
possession with intent to
distribute controlled
substances
Murder; attempted murder;
arson; aggravated assault;
armed robbery; kidnapping;
1st degree criminal sexual
conduct; carjacking; bank
robbery; escape
Deliberate homicide; mitigated
deliberate homicide; rape;
assault on a peace or judicial
officer
Negligent homicide; arson;
aggravated assault; assault
with a deadly weapon;
robbery; burglary; aggravated
burglary; aggravated
kidnapping; possession of
explosives; criminal
distribution of dangerous
drugs; criminal possession of
dangerous drugs; criminal
possession with intent to

1/1/1995

1/1/1992

8/1/1996

1/1/1975
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Any age

distribute dangerous drugs;
criminal manufacture of
dangerous drugs; possession of
drugs; use of a threat to coerce
street gang membership;
escape
Any felony

[Vol. 96

7/1/1981

NEB. REV.

§ 43276 (2004)
Oklahoma
STAT.

OKLA.
STAT. tit.
10, § 73062.6 (2004)

Vermont
VT. STAT.

ANN. tit.
33, § 5506
(2004)

16 and
older
15 and
older

Any misdemeanor

16 and
older

1st degree burglary;
aggravated assault or battery
of a police officer;
intimidating a witness;
trafficking or manufacturing
illegal drugs; assault or battery
with a deadly weapon;
maiming; 2nd degree burglary
if two or more adjudications
for 1st or 2nd degree burglary;
2nd degree rape; use of a
firearm while in commission
of a felony

16 and
older

Arson; aggravated assault;
robbery; murder;
manslaughter; kidnapping;
unlawful restraint; maiming;
sexual assault; burglary in an
occupied dwelling

2nd degree murder;
kidnapping; 1st degree
manslaughter; robbery; 1st
degree rape; forcible sodomy;
lewd molestation; 1st degree
arson; shooting with intent to
kill; discharging a weapon
from a vehicle

7/1/1996

7/17/1981
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Virginia

14 and

VA. CODE
ANN.
§ 16.1269.1
(2004)

older

Wyoming

12 and
older

WYO.
STAT. ANN.

§ 14-6-203
(2004)
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14 and
older

17 and
older

Murder; aggravated malicious
wounding; negligent homicide;
felonious injury by mob;
kidnapping; aggravated
battery; aggravated battery of a
law enforcement officer;
poisoning; adulteration of
products; robbery; carjacking;
rape; forcible sodomy; object
sexual penetration
Felony or misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment
for more than six months
Murder; manslaughter;
kidnapping; 1st or 2nd degree
sexual assault; robbery;
aggravated assault; aircraft
hijacking; 1st or 2nd degree
arson; aggravated burglary;
any felony if previously
adjudicated as a delinquent for
two acts which if committed
by an adult would constitute
felonies
Any felony

1/1/1997

1/1/1975
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Appendix 2
Final Models and Fit Statistics
Series
Violent Crime
Arizona
Arkansas'
Mississippi
Missouri
California'
Colorado
Utah
Nevada
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana'
Mississippi
Missouri'
Michigan
Indiana'
New York
Montana
North Dakota
Idaho
Nebraska'
Oklahoma'
Vermont'
Virginia'
Wyoming
Homicide
Arizona
Arkansas'
California'
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Michigan

Final Model
(p,d,g)(P,D,Q)s*
(O,l,1)(O,l,1)s

(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)( 0,0,1)s
(0,1,1)(0,1,2)s

(0,1,1)(0,0,3)s
(0,1,1)(0,0,2)s
(0,1,1 )(O,O,3)s
(0,0,1)(0,1,1)s
(0,1,1)(0,0,2)s
(0,1,1)

(0,1,1)(0,0,3)s
(0,1,1)(0,0,1)s
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)s
(0,0,1)(0,1,1)s

(0,1,1)(0,0,3)s
s
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)(0,0,3)s
s
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
s
(0,1,O1)

(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)
(0,1,1)

Q-Statistic**

31.46
42.08
35.74
31.38
35.59
40.76
38.47
26.00
33.07
23.48
42.20
25.61
30.84
23.99
40.12
16.14
39.20
45.21
26.68
41.14
39.21
41.02
45.28
26.36

p <.59

43.52
42.87
30.54
29.05
35.21
39.88
37.04
42.66

p <.15
p <.17
p < .68
p <. 7 5
p < .46
p < .26
p<. 3 8
p< .18

p <.19
p < .39
p < .55
p< .30
p <.17
p < .20
p < .84
p < .46
p < .93
p<. 1 1
p < .85
p < .62
p < .90
p <.15
p <. 9 9
p < .29
p <.12
p < .84
p <.13
p < .25
p <.14
p < .09
p< .85

Degrees of
Freedom

2006]

DETERRENCE OR IRRELEVANCE?
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118
37.89 p <.34
(0,1,1)
Montana
118
20.51 p <.98
(0,1,1)
Nebraska
118
36.99 p < .38
(0,1,1)
Oklahoma
118
33.14 p <.56
(0,1,1)
Mississippi,
104
27.94 p < .72
(0,1,1)(0,1,2)s
Missouri
119
45.90 p < .10
(0,0,0)
Vermont'
118
32.72 p <.57
(0,1,1)
Virginia
118
29.20 p <.74
(0,1,1)
Wyoming'
Control series italicized.
1Log transformations were performed in order to make the series variance
stationary.
* (p,d,q)(P,D,Q)s: p = Auto regressive process, d = Differenced, q = Moving
average process, P = Seasonal auto regressive process, D = Seasonally
differenced, Q = Seasonal moving average process.
** Q-Statistic = Box-Jenkins test statistic for the null hypothesis
that the

model's residuals are distributed as white noise.
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